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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Claimant is not seeking to reweigh the evidence or to change findings of credibility, but is
asking this Court to apply existing statutory and case la\\ regarding termination, burden of proof
and misconduct to the factual findings uf tl1t: Commissi@.
ARGUMENT
l.

NO SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COM:VHSSION'S
FINDING THAT

Ms.

THRALL VOLlJNTARILY QUIT HER EMPLOYMENT WITHOUT

GOOD CAUSE.

Respondent misunderstands the concept of a fixced resignation. A forced resignation
does not necessarily consist only of the use of actual force or coercion to sign a resignation.
Instead a ··forced resignation"' normally occurs when an employee is given the opportunity to
resign in lieu of termination. See ( or/er v. Tmi-n of Benton, 827 F. Supp. 2d 700 (resignation in

Dist., 98 Idaho 330, (1977).

Whether Ms. Thrall was told at that meeting she would be

immediately terminated or not is not dispositive of the issue. "The test is whether sufficient
words or actions by the employer would logically lead a prudent man to believe his tenure had
been terminated.'' Jackson

l'.

1'vlinidoku Irrigation DisL 98 Idaho 330, 334-35 (1977) Calling an

at \Vil! employee into the office just after she had made a mistake and offering her a chance to
resign because it will be in her best interest sends a clear message that would lead any prudent
person to believe her tenure was terminated.
The Commission ·s decision emphasizes that Ms. Thrall .. chose" to resign. R., Vol. I, p.
20. Respondent further argues that because Ms. Thrall spent time considering and discussing
with her employer whether or not to resign that she must have had options to weigh. This new
assertion runs counter to the Respondent's ovvn testimony at hearing.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

in the transcript
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of the hearing. Commission· s Decision. or even m the Respondent's brief is there a choice
offered to

Thrall other

resign or

fired.

the record indicates that, prior to

being called in and asked to resign,

Thrall had made attempts to transfer or find a more

suitable situation. Tr., p. 22 iincs 12-13

In light of the undisputed fact that Ms. Thrall would

have been terminated that day if she had not chosen to resign, she was then only choosing
between termination and resignation. The case law of our sister states and previous rulings by
this Court indicate that the Commission erred by ruling this type of "choice" constitutes a
voluntary quit for the purposes of unemployment benefit eligibility.
Not only is this decision contrary to established law. it punishes those employees with a
strong desire to find future employment.

The main incenti\'e for employees to agree to a

resignation in lieu of termination is that they will more easily be able to secure employment in
the future. Prospective employers almost without exception ask if a potential employee has been
terminated in the past.

By ruling that this type of forced resignation is a voluntary quit the

Commission has discouraged employees who care about future job prospects from making
themselves more easily employable in the future.
2.

PUTnt·--iG THE ONUS O?\ CL1\li\l/\NT TO PROVE THE ABSENCE OF MISCONDUCT
IS NOT HARMLESS ERROR.

The Commission stated in its decision that the --claimant has not demonstrated that her
imminent discharge would have been for reasons other than misconduct."

As stated in

Claimant's Opening Brief it is well established that an employer bears the burden to prove
misconduct. A reversal of this burden of proof is anything but harmless and explains how the
Commission could find misconduct v,hen the Examiner
no competent evidence to
that she was discharged
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

found the Respondent "presented

that the claimant did not perform her job duties as expected or
misconduct.. ... (R .. Vol. l p. 1

16-1

Further. the Commission
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has seemingly failed to account for

Thrall"s testimony that physical ailments and vision

problems explained the trouble she was having at ,vork when it stated, ·'She did not provide a
reason for why she \Vas able to adequately perform her job before. but had ongoing problems
with patient identification as of

·1 2013.'. (R., Vol. l p. 3 L. 13) The above statement is not a

finding that Ms. Thrall's testimony is not credible but simply an indication that the Commission
missed said testimony. Further. even if this Court can scrape up enough evidence to theoretically
find misconduct, it would he mere appropriate to remand this issue back to the Commission to
apply the correct burden of proof, base a decision on all of the evidence in the record, and to
issue more detailed findings of fact as this Court did in Vernon v. Omark Indus., 113 Idaho 358
(1987).

3.

No

SLfBSTi\:\TL\L _,\ ~,1) C()l\lPETENT EVlf)LNC:E EXfSTS TC) SLJPPC)RT THE

COf\Hv!ISSl0 1'(s

FIM)f'\(i

THAT

Ms.

Tl!R!\LL

WAS

DISCHARGED

FOR

MISCONDUCT.

The essence of Respondent's argument seems to be that because more than one mistake
was made, a disregard of the employers standards of behavior has occurred. While the subjective
intent to harm ones employer is not necc.·ssary to constitute misconduct under this test, the terms
·'disregard .. and ·'standard of behavior" indicate misconduct must be something more than good
faith errors. IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02.c and Wrohle r. Bonners Feny Ranger Station, 97 Idaho
900, (1976) help to clari(y what types of actions constitute misconduct and which do not.
Respondent asks this Court to disregard Wrobf e because it dealt with an intentional lie and not an
accidental mistake.

However, the ruie in Wroble should apply even more firmly to an

unintentional mistake than to an intentional one.

This Court has previously rejected the

proposition that "any discharge tbat is reasonably based on the employer's own rules will always
result in a denial of the discharged employee's unemployment benefits." Beaty v. City of Idaho

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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Falls. l l 0 Idaho at 892 ( l

see (_ 'Jwpnwn v.

}K Line

. Inc 147 Idaho 178

(2009). lDAPA 09.01.30.275.02.c indicates that the exceptions are not solely reserved for one
time onlv

Rather. they delineate

difference between a disregard for a standard

behavior and an honest mistake made in good faith.
Nothing in the record indicates that Ms. Thrall was failing to follow a known procedure
or that she disregarded any rules or policies of the employer.

The record reflects that she

inadvertently mislabeled specimens on a few occasions due in part to physical ailments and
vision problems Tr._ p .. 22 lines 20-25. That the applicable IDOL regulations make allowances
for inefficiency, failure of good perfrmnance due to inability or incapacity, etc. indicate that they
contemplate not only one time mistakes but situations in which the employee is attempting to do
everything that is asked of them but is falling short through no fault of her own and no failure to
abide by the rules.
The difference ·between a disregard for a rule or procedure and an accidental mistake is
demonstrated in Idaho case la\V determining misconduct under the standard of behavior test.
Workers have been held to be ineligible f<x unemployment benefits due to misconduct involving
extended absence vvithout permission "'1 dams v. ,1spen Water. Inc., 150 Idaho 408 (2011 ), using
vulgar language that showed disrespect for management in presence of other employees. Rigali v.

Wal-Afar/ Associates. Inc., 151 Idaho 707 (2011 ), failing a random drug test Desi/et v. Glass
Doctor. 142 Idaho 655 (2006) showing a disregard for employers rules and policies through
constant tardiness Roll v. ( 'ity of i\fidd!eton, l 05 Idaho 22 ( 1983 ), and where a nurse failed to
follow policy by pre-completing charts when he \Vas asked not to Kivalu v. Life

Centers

Am .. 142 Idaho 262 (2005). Unlike the case before the Court. the previous cases for which this
Court has upheld a finding of misconduct for disregarding a standard of behavior involve a

APPELLANT'S REPLY BR!U
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disregard of a known policy or rule, not an accident or mistake. Respondent also implies that
icated if employees terminated for mere negligence were

hospital safety
given unemployment benefits.
benefits

111

This claim is without merit as eligibility for unemployment

no way interferes v,ith an employer's right to terminate employees at will for

inefficiency or mistakes. nor does it encourage unsafe practices.
Respondent further asks this Court to engage in rulernaking by holding certain
professions to a higher standard as the Pennsylvania court did in Holly v. Unemployment Comp.

Bd Of Review. 617 A.:2d 80. 83-84. What Respondent fails to do, however, is inform this Court
that the rationale used by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Holly was rejected and
expressly overruled by Pennsylvania's mvn Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that the "Commonwealth Court's adoption of the public safety exception to this rule
contravenes what the General Assembly provided for in Section 40:2(e), its application by the
Commonwealth Court was improper. We are bound by the express words of the statute and
cannot alter them to suit our own public policy predilections."" Grieb v. Unemployment Comp.

Bd. olRevieH'. 573 Pa. 594. 603 (2003). Similarly, Idaho's unemployment laws do not provide
for the courts or the Commission to apply higher level of standards for conduct based on the
profession and doing so would only serve to thwart the humane purpose behind the statute.
Respondent also makes similar arguments with regard to how severely the conduct affects
the employer, stating that the misconduct here ·'work(ed) to undermine the very nature of the
employer· s business .. :· (Brief of Employer-Respondent p. 15) The test for misconduct should
not be centered around
to examine these issues ts

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

or his particular business. Rather the more appropriate
the

framework provided by the Idaho legislature
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indicating that a disregard for a smndard of behavior constitutes misconduct, while mistakes,
inadvertencies and inefficiency

not

CONCLUSION
The Idaho

Act \Vas enacted to help aileviate the economic and

social hardships caused

unemployment not resulting from the fault of the employee. LC. s 72-

1302. The Act must be libt>rally construed to effect that purpose. In re Potlatch Forests. Inc., 72
Idaho 291 ( 1952). Claimant did everything she could to retain her employment and was forced to
resign.

The record indicates Claimant had no option to continue her employment with

Respondent.

Despite this, the Commission determined that she willingly quit her job.

The

Commision also incorrectly placed the burden of proof on Claimant to show that she was not
terminated for misconduct and failed to account for her testimony regarding medical problems
that led to her mistakes. This error of law regarding the burden of proof caused the Commission
to incorrectly rule that Claimant committed misconduct.

The record reflects that Claimant's

mistakes were due to ordinary negligence and not due to any disregard for the Respondent's
standards of behavior.

Thcrefrirc, Claimant asks this Coun to reverse the decision of the

Commission and reinstate her unemployment compensation benefits.
DATED THIS 16 th day of September, 2014
...--,,

~

~ ~ · ·

Attorney for the Appellant-Claimant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE:

I HEREBY CERTIFY
day of September 20 l

a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent on this 16

th

to the parties and method outlined below:

St. Luke's Regional Medical Center L
C/O Christine M. Salmi
1111 WestJefferson
Boise, ID 83702

Hand Delivered
U.S.Mail
Fax
Fed. Express

Boise Pathology Group, PA
190 E. Bannock St.
Boise. ID 83 712

Hand Delivered
U.S. Mail
Fax
Fed. Express

Tracey K. Rolfsen
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Department of Labor
317 W. Main Street
Boise. ID 83 735

I land Delivered
U.S. Mail
Fax
Fed. Express

D

~

D
D

~

D
D

~

D
D

DATED TIUS 16th day of September 2014
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